Safety culture and training in the Royal Navy and Merchant Navy

“We only really learn when things go wrong”, says David Carter, the Royal Navy’s current Merchant Navy Liaison Officer - only then are deficiencies in procedures, checklists, skills and equipment found and rectified.1

This second blog post of the series reviews how radical improvements in safety culture and training in the Royal Navy (RN) have stemmed from learning from critical incidents at sea during the Second World War (WWII) and Operation ‘Corporate’, the British expedition to recapture the Falklands Islands in 1982.  

In the early years of the Second World War, RN sailors were not systematically instructed in damage repair to keep ships afloat. 2The 1941 sinking of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal provided a systemic shock that inspired new watertight compartment discipline and Damage Control (DC) procedures.3

The Admiralty Manual of Seamanship, in two volumes revised and simplified between 1932 and 1937, was found not fit for purpose in wartime service. Consequently, a distilled version of the Admiralty Manual of Seamanship was produced in late 1943 as a pocketbook ‘primer’ for a large influx of Hostilities Only (H.O.) servicemen 4. Its section on Ship Safety was designed to inspire reverence for the dominant principle of preserving the ship.5

RN safety training following the Second World War continued to centre on fighting fire and flooding. Damage repair and firefighting training from 1945 through the 1980s was conducted at shore establishments near Portsmouth and Plymouth, with very realistic but noxious oil fires. Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, whose RN service extended from 1967 to 2009, refers to a longstanding RN ethos of “every sailor a firefighter”.6

Both the Second World War and the Falklands Conflict in 1982 exposed the Royal Navy and the Merchant Navy (MN) to the relative merits of regulations, procedures, and training then current in each service but the Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) provided merchant seamen with only grounding in RN disciplines.7

Oral histories from survivors of the disastrous PQ17 Convoy from Iceland to Russia in 1942 witness a cursory Merchant Navy approach to survival training in the first part of the Second World War, 8 contributing to heavy loss of life in the Battle of the Atlantic, with seafarers dying for lack of skills to escape from sinking ships. In response, the ‘Outward Bound’ organisation was founded in 1941 to educate young seafarers in survival skills.9 Following major advances in RN medical research and life-saving equipment in the 1950s, the 1964 edition of the Admiralty Manual of Seamanship contained instruction on equipment and organisation for abandoning ship, survival, and rescue, with equivalent instruction for the Merchant Navy included.10

The collaboration between RN and MN in the task force to recapture the Falklands in 1982 generated important fire safety and human factors lessons, notably from the catastrophic fire damage to both the RFA Sir Tristram and the RFA Sir Galahad landing ships, and subsequently improved training, procedures, and equipment for firefighting, ship abandonment, and survivability.11

There were more Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) and requisitioned civilian ‘Ships Taken Up From Trade’ (STUFT) than there were warships,12 and most of the STUFT had RN liaison officers or an RFA advisor embarked.13 Nearly 300 men were killed as a direct result of damage to these ships, including on the RFA landing ship logistics vessels Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, and the Atlantic Conveyor. Nine people were lost in the water from abandoning the Atlantic Conveyor, including the ship’s Captain Ian North, mostly through exhaustion and difficulty of entry to the 25-person RN-issued life rafts, exacerbated by “push-pull” effects of waves against the hull.14

Survivor accounts note how important was the strong relationship between the ship’s captain and the RN Liaison Officer in managing the abandonment of the ship consequent on the catastrophic fires.15 Tragically, some died because of using equipment incorrectly.16, 17, 18, 19  Howard Ormerod, a civilian survivor, recalls conflicting instructions on whether to jump from height wearing an inflated life jacket.20

James Stride, who used to command mobile sea training in the RN, emphasised that the Falklands experience in 1982 was a “wake-up” call leading to substantial revision of systems and training. 21Admiral Lord West, who commanded HMS Ardent in the Falklands, comments that training beforehand had underplayed the effects of loss of communications when a ship has been badly damaged. 22Graham Hockley, aboard HMS Antrim in the Falklands, recalls how learning was shared between ships during the campaign that smoke was more easily blown than extracted from compartments. 23The Phoenix firefighting training facility with fire and smoke simulation at HMS Excellent in Portsmouth now comprises compartmented facsimile ship’s accommodation over three decks. 24The current Havoc Damage Repair Instructional Unit (DRIU) facility at HMS Raleigh near Plymouth has a purpose-built, healable, floodable multi-deck facility, 25and DRIU training still draws on lessons learnt in the Falklands, validated by successful DC experiences in the 2002 grounding of HMS Nottingham.26

The next blog post in this series looks at the history of how wartime experience has led to radical improvements in equipment for life-saving and survivability of shipwreck at sea, particularly in cold water.